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ABSTKACT: It~tercultz4ral contact and communication have allegedly increased in the 
context of glohalization. Both terms are, however, little transparent, evoke a host of 
associations and carry ideological baggage. The present article proposes a framework 
to uilderstand current socio-economic processes by recourse to a particular heterodox 
ccanomic view (Regulationism). I will argue from this point of view that although 
there is no such thing as globalization there are some changes - dominated by 
neoliberal policies - that increase the gap between rich and poor inter- and 
iotranationally. Since these changing structural conditions of distribution (class) 
impact Sundamentally on issues of recognition (identity), i.e. the core of approaches 
to intet.cultura1 communication, I conclude that any theory of the latter has to take 
cconon~ic and political structures into consideration. 
Key~~orlf~s: globalization, Regulationism, class, intercultural communication, i 
power. 
RBSUMBN: El contacto y la comunicación interculturales se han extendido 
texto de la globalización. Ambos términos, sin embargo, son poc0 tran 
evocan un sinfin de asociaciones y contienen implicaciones ideológic 
r~rliculo propone un marco para comprender 10s procesos socio-e 
:\cluales basado en una teoria económica heterodoxa (el regulacionismo), 
del cua1 se argumenta que, a pesar de no existir la globalización como tal, sí 
ien ciertos carnbios dominados por las políticas neoliberales que acrecie 
divisi611 entre ricos y pobres, tanto internacional como intranacionalmente. 
que las cambiantes condiciones estructurales de distribución (clase social) re 
cuten en las cuestiones de reconocimiento (identidad), es decir, el fundame 
los estudios sobre la comunicación intercultural, se concluye que cualquier 
que Ja aborde debe incluir el papel de las estructuras económicas y políti 
Ptrluhrns cluve: globdización, Regulacionismo, clase social, co 
cultural, identidad, poder. 
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1, Intrsduction 
All vogue words tend to share a similar fate: The more experiences they pretend to 
makc transparent, the more they themselves become opaque. (Bauman, 1998: 1) 
In t l~e  most general sense, globalization discourses refer to changes beyond 
thc confines of the nation state: 
Slsbalization, simply put, denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding 
up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction. 
lt rcfcrs to a shift or transformation in the scale of human organizations that links 
distant cominunities and expands the reach of power relations across the world's 
regions md continents. (Held and McGrew, 2002: 1) 
But that is as far as commonality reaches. The acadernic literature on globalization 
is vast, highly controversial and displays a multitude of different, often 
contradictory perspectives reflecting an actually rather heterogeneous group of 
topies in the domains of business andlor politics, society, culture, technology, 
msdia, the environment and others. Often, neither the respective focus nor the 
allcged interrelationship between these different spheres is made sufficiently 
cxplicit. Morcover, the causality for alleged changes towards the global scale are 
attributed to a range of factors or their combination, for instance, an increase in 
international trade, portfolio and foreign direct investment, the intensification 
of border crossings and migration, the emergence of new information and 
communication technologies and their impact upon the structures and processes 
in Gnar~cial and other trading, the nature or transformation of capitalism, changes 
i n  the function and form of nation states, an increased reach and power of 
supra-national institutions, other non-governmental organizations (NGOS) andlor 
social movements, the spread of consumerism andlor democracy, and many 
mors. These different topics are inexorably linked to specific evaluations and 
polilical perspectives of the situation, and concomitant orientations towards or 
rccon~mendations of particular courses of action. 
Zn addition to this, the globalization debate has permeated all kinds of social 
strata and sphcres. Lay people draw on globalization discourses as a resource in 
order to lnake sense of an increasingly complex and interrelated national and 
intcrnational environment. Business executives and managers do not only seem 
to havc partly shifted corporate strategies and priorities to the international plane 
but to have likewise adopted references to globalization in order to legitimate 
forrns of t.estructuring and reorganization, for instance through flexible specialization, 
divcrsií'ication, downsizing, and outsourcing. The term has become especially 
popular with psliticians, who often refer, sometimes in fairly unspecific ways, to 
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globalization as a non-negotiable, externa1 (economic) pressure or logic that 
forces governments to take specific decisions and actions. For some, this invocation 
of globalization is strategic and rhetorical in nature seeking to displace responsibility 
for otherw ise ullpalatable reforms. 
111 general, it is fair to argue that the term globalization has become a weasel 
word carrying a load of associations and ideological baggage. As a rhetorical 
device it can be employed in a variety of vague and obfuscating ways to bring 
aboirt the same socio-material changes that it is meant to denote in the first place. 
By gaining alliances and identifications through specific representations of 
social changc and desirable outcomes, people's perspectives, dispositions and, 
trllirnately, thcjr actions are shaped in particular ways. As such it is important to 
subjcct tbc usc of the term globalization in specific contexts to close scrutiny and 
cal.cf~11 analysis in order to reveal the stance the particular author takes in the 
realm of diverse perspectives and definitions. 
2. Globalization. Emphasizing Complexities 
Thc posilion I have adopted here could be characterized as transformationalist 
or moderate, strongly cmphasizing the agency of political actors and the contingency 
sf potcnlial structural outcomes. I contend with Hirst and Thompson's (1996: 4) 
critical-norn3ative message that the reference to globalization as a coherent and 
almost nalurally occurring process or even end-state is a rhetorical means 
cmployed in srder to <<build up a cornrnunity of usage when there needs to be 
stricl diffcrentiation of meaning>>. For them, globalization cr[. . .] is a myth for a 
tvorld wilhout illusions, but it is also one that robs us of hope. Global markets 
arc dominant, and they face no threat from any viable contrary political project, 
for it is I~eld that Western social democracy and socialism of the Soviet bloc are 
both finished>> (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 6). Although I agree in disrnissing 
the stxategic use of globalization in the context of neoliberal discourse (globalism), 
I tvill nevcrtheless hold that there are some changes underway that would 
warrant a new tcrminology. I will mainly draw on work by Jessop (1997, 1999 a, 
1999 h, 2000,2002,2003), who views current socio-economic processes in their 
I~istorical context, thus catering for contingencies and the complexity of current 
international cha~iges in the economic, political and cultural spheres and their 
interrelationship. Globalization is, as Jessop (1999 b: 1) has pointed out, not a 
sillglc, coherent causal process but a <<complex, chaotic and overdeterrnined outcome 
o1 EI multi-scalar, multi-temporal, and multi-centric series of processes operating 
i11 specific struetural contextw. In less abstract terms this means that there is, 
first or all, no primary scale (global, triadic, national, regional or urban) of current 
ceo~ion~ic reorganization. Changes occur on all these levels and mutually influence 
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each o111er. This entails, secondly, that there are different centres of globalization, 
bot11 on a national (the us, Great Britain, South East Asia) as well as a geographical 
Icvel. Thesc constitute, however, not a <<[. . ] pre-given set of places, spaces, or 
seales that arc merely being re-ordered. Instead, new places are emerging, new 
spaccs are being created, new scales of organization are being developed and 
new horizons o i  action are being imagined - all in the light of new forns of 
(undcrstanding) competition>> (Jessop, 1999 b: 5; see also Dicken, 1998: 426). 
The autlior refers specifically to the emerging network of global cities, the 
rcstructuring of urban spaces and the growth of cross-border regions in order to 
c1111ancc thcir international competitiveness, processes that might suggest the 
tcrm <~e'lurbanization''> (Jessop, 1999 b: 4) instead of <<globalization>> (or the 
morc ssphisticated notion of <<glocalization>>). 
Thirdly, different spheres such as culture, media, migration, technology, 
business, finance, education, etc. are characterized by their own modes, rhythms, 
devclopmcnts, intensities and resistances. In sum, it is therefore 
I.. .] ~nislcading to cxplain specific events and phenomena in tems of the process 
of <cglobalixation>~, pointless to subsume anything or everything under the umbrella of 
crglsbalizatiai>>, and unhelpful to seek to link anything and everythmg to ccglobalization>> 
as if this ssmchow conveys more insight than alternative rubrics [for instance, 
libernlizarisrz or internationalization] could [...I (Jessop, 2000: 339) 
Xnstead OS attributing causal force to globalization itself, Jessop contextualizes 
eonte~nporary processes historically from a Regulationist position. 
Aftcr the crisis of the Keynesian National Welfare State (KNWS),' the historical 
arrangement or spatio-temporalJix2 between national economies and the respective 
states, and its predominant mode of production, fo rd i~m,~  a restructuring and 
rcncwal of the mode of accumulation4 is currently underway. The KNWS has at 
least partially becn replaced in many Western countries by another spatio-temporal 
<<fix)>, the so-called Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime (SWPN), a 
1 .  Thc tcrm goes back to the British economist John Maynard Keynes ( 1 8 8 3 - 1 9 4 6 )  who had advocated that 
only n celativcly equitable distribution of resources would strengthen the demand side and hence the 
cap3cil.y to consurne which in turn would stimulate economic growth. Main responsibilities of national 
govcrnmcnts therefore iticluded to ensure full employment and to regulate collective bargaining between 
cmploycrs and unions. 
2. Thc tcrm refers to the basic orientation of a state in a given period consisting of a specific accumulation 
slratcgy (for instanceJort1ism) and a national political project (for instance the welfare sta te ) .  
3. I'he fordist modc of regulation derives its name from the production paradigm first introduced by Henry 
I%rd, lt is based on economies of scale, standardisation, mass production and consumption and thus the 
nccd for a continuous expansion of the market, i.e. increasing demand. It is accompanied by a minute 
division of labour based on the time-and-motion studies of Frederick Charles Taylor ( t a y l o r i s m ) .  
4. Buzzwords like the xinformation economyu, athe knowledge society,, aglobalization)), &e learning 
cconomy)), aturbo capitalismr and others try to capture this development. 
ICARIN KO'I'ZMANN G/obiili:, irtio~~ cind lnrarcrrlt~tral Communication 257 
tcrm tliat designates the shifting of state activities - albeit to different degrees in 
difierent nationai csntexts - towards the promotion of greater flexibility, innovation 
(a ~~ost~forrli~st mode of accumulation) and the opening of national economies to 
intcrnational trade. Thc economic and political spheres have been re-articulated 
and transformcd, a process that is still underway and, as a matter of fact, highly 
contested. The nation state still plays an important, albeit altered role, though the 
national is not the primary scale of economic policy or orientation anymore. 
As Jcssop (2000) argues, state power has been transferred upwards (e.g. to 
suyranalional institutions such as the EU, the IMF or the WTO), downwards 
( t l~ ro~~gh ,  for instance, decentralization and regionalization) and sideways 
(thl.oug11 the rise of international relations, cross-border and inter-local regions, 
etc.). Thus, 80% of international commerce is conducted between industrial 
natiol? states and rcgions, only 15% of world trade between continents, with the 
ovcrall participation of Africa arnounting to only 3% (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2002: 50; Koopmann and Franzmeyer, 2003: 17). This development suggests 
thc tcrm c(triadization>> as the regional concentration in the three clusters, EU, 
USA and Asian Pacific, rather than c<globalisation>> (Dicken 1998: 116). 
Important to notc here are the continuities in these processes based on the 
i nl icre~~ t co~~flictual re ations in capitalism: 
Capital accumulation depends essentially on the market-mediated exploitation of 
~vagc-labouc For, while markets mediate the search for added value, they cannot 
thcmselvcs produce it. Moreover, the very process of commodification rooted in the 
sprcad of thc market mechanism generates contradictions which cannot be resolved 
by thal mcchanism itself. For example, the cornrnodity is both an exchange-value 
and a usc-valuc; the worker is both an abstract unit of labour power substitutable by 
othcr such units (or, indeed, other factors of production) and a concrete individual 
with spccific slcills, knowledge, and creativity; the wage is both a cost of production 
alld a sourcc of dcmand; money functions both as an international currency and as 
nntional money; productive capital is both abstract value in motion (notably in the 
forni 01' profits available for reinvestment) and a concrete stock of time - and place- 
spccific asscts io the course of being valorized; and so forth. These structural 
conlradictions are always present in the capital relation but they can assume 
dií'fcrcnl forrns in different contexts. They can also prove more or less manageable 
dcl~cnding on the specific ccspatio-temporal fixes>> and the nature of the institutionalized 
class cs~npro~niscs with which they are from time to time associated. (Jessop, 1999 
12: 6 )  
Xn bot11 capitalist regimes or modes of accumulation - KWNS and the SWPN - 
these contradictions are present (continuity). The way they are dealt with, however, 
diffcrs grcatly (change). Neo-liberalism as the current predominant policy 
incrcascs thc first side of the contradictions, reinforcing crthe abstract-formal 
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~~iomnent oFcxchangc value>> <<at the expense of the substantive-material moment of 
use value)> (1 999 b: 7). The deepening and aggravating fundamental contradictions 
(including n~arkct failures, the uninhibited movement and accumulation of capital 
and thc concomitant rising gaps between rich and poor and environmental 
dcgradation) might, in fact, prevent the full realization of something worth to be 
called globalization: c<It is in disrupting past fixes and compromises without 
providing a, ncw structured coherence for continued capital accumulation that 
neo-liberal h rms  of globalization appear to be so threatening to many capitalists 
- let alone othcr - interests,, (Jessop, 1999 b: 8). Contrary to Hirst and 
Tl?otnpson ( J  996) thhen, who claim that current processes of internationalization 
arc llot qualitatively different from those before World War I and, thus, do not 
dcservc a ncw tcrminology, Jessop (1999 b: 2) argues that there are crucial 
dil'fcrcnees bctwecn these historical phases (as outlined above) including for 
inst~tnce a lnilch wider asymmetry between largely irnrnobile labour power and 
mobilc capital today, whereas the last century saw an enormous movement of 
pcople eros~ing national boundaries looking for new opport~nities:~ <<[. . ] the 
main forms of intcrnatisnalization in trade, finance, indirect and direct investment, 
scrviccs, and R&II have been changing as has the relative weight of these different 
domains i11 overall global flows [...I>> (Jessop, 1999 b: 2). Turning back the 
wbecl oE social progress is prone to either cause social conflict or intense efforts 
to rnakc thesc changes more or less acceptable. The role of discourse in these 
proccsscs of pcrsuading citizens and workers of the beneficial effects of a neoliberal 
rcstructurjng has therefore greatly increased. 
Having outlined the general implications of the neoliberal project of restructuring, 
J will nocv tic these considerations more specifically to political-ethical questions 
any thcory of jntereultural communication should address as central issues in the 
ficld. Thc focus will be on questions of socio-econornic distribution as a necessary 
~>rccondition For the full participation and recognition of others in society and 
thus in communication. 
3. Social Inequality and Misrecognition 
A large part of the debate about the relation between processes of globalization 
and cultc~re has centered on the effects of the spread of specific goods, services 
md patterns of csnsurnption on different cultures. It is feared that a global consumer 
5. Sec also S~ngh  (I998 6), who argues that in the 19"' century citizenship was granted far more easily 
uStncc Ihcn, however, ~ntcrnat~onal mjgratlon has been reduced to a tr~ckle because of drac01llan u m g r a h o n  
low\ and restriclive consula~ practlcess 
c~~l ture  and its products might be invading, marginalizing, substituting or even 
eradieating local patterns of consumption, production and cultural practice~.~ 
Coca-Cola is not just an additional option for all the people around the globe that 
drink it, but ai option that tends to force other options out of existence. And what 
couats as compctitisn often ends up as a meaningless struggle between massive 
corporations selling identical products in different packaging. No one's quality of 
lifc is significantly improved by the ability to drink Coke rather than Pepsi. [...I 
Thus, finally, it is an open question whether removing barriers to trade will provide 
pcoylc with new options that they prefer, or rather remove pre-existing options that 
tlicy weuld have prcferred to the best that is now available to them. (Dupré, 2001: 
1 1  1-1 12) 
Wl~ilc lhcre surely is an increasing convergence of patterns of consumption, 
commodities, entertainment and even systems of cultural beliefs and practices, 
diffcrsnces in soeio-economic positioning and hence c<lifestyles>> are widening. 
As has been argued in the preceding sections, current neoliberal policies work as 
a polarizing force generating and worsening economic, ecological and social 
distsrlions such as poverty, inequality and inequity in terms of opportunities and 
disti-ibution of resources, both on a national and international plane: 
Tlicrc is no doubt that globalization as currently proposed excludes a large part of 
tbc world and bestows on only a few countries significant purchasing power and a 
high lcvcl of productivity. Globalization is really a rich-country phenomenon and, 
to be more exact, something for the richest sectors within those rich countries. In 
olhcr words, insidc the North there is now North and a South, just as both exist 
withiii thc South. (Ugartcche, 2000: 5 )  
The dissemination of a sophisticated global life style or culture is indeed very 
limitcd in scalc while not in scope: national <celites>> are becoming internationally 
increasingly similar in their forms of consumption and entertainment (ways of 
drcssing, driving, eating, working, traveling, and so on), their mobility and 
aeeess to technologies. At the same time, they become ever more disconnected7 
frsm slhcr classes of the same nationality: 
6 Thc a~gumentatlon íocuscs on the ~nflux of more or less standardized goods and services which lead to 
clculln:, apar t~culac types of dc~nand and the shapmg of consumer tastes and preferencesx (Dicken 1998 
249). 'l'licsc tend to dommate reg~onal markets rapidly and thus marglnalize local products This is not 
to bc contused w~th  the vlew that global practices and goods automatlcally lead to homogenizatlon and 
c l ~ m ~ n a t ~ o n  oi"d~Fi.e~ence Global products do have to be appropnated and adjusted locally, a process that 
~nvoivca cclocallz,ltlon>> and finally generates a hybrld ccglocalizationu 
7 In foct, lnany oi tliebe exclusrve goods denve the~r value from belng inaccessible to others Consumption 
ant1 posse5h101i oí' thcse goods and servlces become a status and class issue 
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I,os Iiabila~~tcs de Beverly Hills y de 10s barrios opulentos de México, Lima, 
Joha~iiiesburgo  Bombay, a pesar de las distancias continentales que 10s separan, viven 
cn eondiciones de vida muy cercanas entre ellos, pero muy lejanas de 10s habitantes de 
Los barrios pobres vecinos que 10s rodean. De Los Ángeles hasta Vladivostock y desde 
Río hasta Manila, mBs personas que no ven crecer sus ingresos, desempleadas y pobres, 
eonviven con pcclueñas tlites que residen rodeadas de muros con su propia policia y 
consuniicndo toda clasc de preciosidades globales. (de Rivera, 1998: 113) 
IThc inliabitants of Beverly Hills and the opulent quarters of Mexico, Lima, 
Johanncsburg or Bombay live, despite the continental distances that separate them, 
in vcry similar living conditions albeit very different from the inhabitants of those 
quarters that surround them. From Los Angeles to Vladivostock and from Rio to 
Manila, mare pcople who either do not see their income rise or are unemployed and 
poor, livc close to small elites whose residencies are surrounded by walls guarded 
by thcir own police and who consume all kinds of global luxuries.] 
Tlic asgumcnt put forth here is therefore that cultures are not assimilated into one 
global dominant culture through coercion, consent or a mix of the two, nor is it 
argucd that the spread of modernizing elements automatically leads to a loss of 
traciilional ci~ltures.~ Increasing inequality, however, is adverse to any form of 
conirnunicative meaning making processes since it distorts systematically the 
intcrpcrsonal relationships at play.Vven though people can of course react to 
incquality in diffcrent ways (for example in a compliant or resistant fashion) 
dcpending on a variety of circumstantial and other factors,'O unequal conditions 
arc generally not favourable. Notwithstanding suffering caused by physical 
Iiardship and insecurity, individuals need <<freedom from the arbitrary exercise of 
pswer, a measure of privacy and control of their lives, and opportunities for self- 
exprcssion>> (Parekh, 2000: 132). On a macro level, such scenarios are partly 
S A5 Saycr (2000 7) drgues, thls perspectlve IS often associated with the destrucbon and loss of somewhat 
~tIcell/cd, t~adltlonal, mal l  and lntact communlties and thelr systems of customs, values and bellefs He 
polnia out lhat tultulal values can also be oppresslve aAt the same tlme as capltallsm de-values some 
placllccs, ~ t s  contlnued closlon of tradltlonal relahonships frees them up to be detemned by actors 
ilmougl? dc l~bc~~i t~on  and cholce rather than conventlon, thereby allowlng the posslbillty of a re-moralizabon 
111 501iic cascw 
9 l ~ i l c ~ c ~ ~ l t ~ ~ ~ a l  lnlscoliilllL liltatlm IS of course not excluslvely based on socio-economc dlfferences 
Int~cas~ng ~nequ~~l~ty ,  tliough, m<akes non- 01 mlscommunlcabon more llkely The pollt~cs of remstnbutlon 
:~nd ~ c t o g ~ i ~ t ~ o n  sliould thus not be treated separately 
10 Whc11 thc g d ~  bctwcen I I C ~  and poo1 w~dens and politlcal and economc power 1s taken away from some 
g~ onps, thcac mlght, aa Caytells (1998,2000,2003) and others have repeatedly argued, start to reemphasize 
local and ctlinlc ldent~t~es wlilch nilght In turn glve rrse to resistance, localism, fragmentatlon and, In ~ t s  
wo~sl Lasc, f~~nd~~~iicntal lsm Thls IS often combmed wlth the perception of powerful homogenlzlng 
fo~cc\, f o ~ c ~ g n  values and practlces generated by markets whlch endanger particular socleties <Unable 
lo d l lc~ t  lhc d~$nltcgtdt~on O P thelr tradlt~onal cultures which have hitherto glven meanlng to thelr llves 
and licld thclu togetliel as communltles, they expenence a verltable moral panlc and become vulnerable 
10 pcdlals ol a fundnmcntal~st return to an allegedly prlstlne past,, (Parekh, 2000 164) 
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creatcd by the loss of equal democratic participation in political processes - 
decisions about how to organize society and the social good - through an ever 
grcatcr politicai power of unelected entities, the concomitant exclusion of more and 
more stakcholders in debates and decisions, and a general reduction of citizenship 
to consumer cl~oices." On a different level, the increasing interrelatedness of 
some (<celite>>) social circles at the expense of others undermines social cohesion, 
dissects solidarity and trust and, thus, the very structure and processes of democratic 
societics. 
Apart from the structural preconditions for cornrnunication and participation, 
though, inequality impacts also on the micro-level of situated communication. 
As Saycr (2000, 2005) argues succinctly, recognition is based on evaluative 
judgments. With little control over the conditions of their lives and work, lack of 
knowledge and resources recognized as valuable by society, individuals, their 
practiccs, vdues and experiences may become devalued in the eyes of the others:12 
Jdentitics are valued or devalued because of the place of their bearers in the prevailing 
structure of power, and their revaluation entails corresponding changes in the latter. 
Women, gays, cultural minorities and others cannot express and realize their 
identities without the necessary freedom of self-detennination, a climate conducive 
to diversity, material resources and opportunities, suitable legal arrangements, and 
so on, and all these call for profound changes in all areas of life. (Parekh, 2000: 2)13 
At thc samc time, sociai misrecognition tends to impact upon people's identity and 
sense of worth. Given the fact that reciproca1 recognition is institutionally 
ernbedded and interactions often occur under grossly unequal conditions, Sayer 
(2605: 219) argues that only crin a relatively equal and free society can all develop 
thcir capacities, achieve something and thereby gain recognition>>. Subjects have 
to be e [ .  ..] in a strong sense equal and free to exercise autonomy, not merely 
formally in terms of their rights but in terms of their capabilities for living in 
ways they have reason to vaIuel> (Sayer, 2005: 219). Any form of market 
f~~ndamentdism is thus prone to contribute to the dirninishing of cultural diversity 
either through exclusion, marginalization or intervention: <<The fear is that the 
I I .  Garcia Caticlini (1995: 208) for inst'ance argues that today nation states are less characterized by solidarity 
betwecn citizens, but have increasingly become communities of consumers differentiated by income (but 
unified, iliside tlieir socio-econorhic class by similar tastes and <difestyles>>). Consumerism, however, is 
devoid of any moral or civic substance. 
12. 1 :lm alguing here in terms o€ conditional recognition (based on achievement), albeit unconditional 
recognitiot~ is even more distorted by relations of domination (Sayer, 2005: 225). 
13. Sce also Saycr (2005: 222): <<Differences in the distribution of respect, contempt, envy, resentment or 
condcscension and deference are p'artly a product of inequalities in economic dishibution, not merely 
bccause wealth is often taken as an index of worth, but because economic inequalities make objective 
ditferences to people i11 terms of their chances of achieving things that are likely to win conditional 
mcognition*. 
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dií'fercnt cultural standards could lead to an international "race to the bottom", 
down to conforrnity to the more "cost-effective" norms and values of other 
culturcs. All those who are too inflexible to adapt to these cost-effective standards 
would be wiped out in competition>) (Lohr and Steinmann, 1998: 11). 
Surcly, capitalism itself is difference blind, meaning that as long as differences 
do not disturb the srnooth running of business they can potentially be integrated.14 
Altl?ough thc functioning of capitalism is not dependent on gender, ethnic or 
olhcr di Ffercnces crits concrete practices are usually gendered,, (Ray and Sayer, 
1999: 14). Social stratification and <<ordem often build upon and follow ethnic, 
cultural, gcnder and/or age markers of difference.I5 A further increase in economic 
i~~equality hus deepens unequal conditions for cultures, societies and regions 
cntaili~~g a ccyrogressive spatial segregation, separation and exclusion>> (Bauman, 
1998: S ;  sec also Castells, 2000: 67).16 Bearing in mind that there is hardly a <<full 
structural integration and strategic coordination across the globe,,, Jessop (1999 
b: 4-5) argucs that <(C.. I the various processes involved in globalization actually 
rc-order - across economic space on different spatial scales - place-based 
diRerences and complementarities as the basis for dynarnic competitive advantages 
1.. . 1)) . r7  Regional cultures are thus not only exposed to the embedding effects of 
thc market, but arc often seen as not useful, problematic or even at cross-purposes 
will~ capital accumulation, and not being compatible with consumer or enterprise 
culture:'" 
Nicht mit okonomischer, finanzieller und politischer Macht ausgestattete regionale 
Ku llurcn schen sich z.T. einem Abwertungsdruck ihrer humanen und okologischen 
Rcssourccn, ihrcs Sozialkapitals und ihrer Institutionen ausgesetzt, der einer 
Kapitularion vor dem politisch-okonomischen Expansionszwang der Sthkeren 
glcitahkommt [...I (Elsner, 2000: 8) 
14 In Incl. Indr kcla nccd, ,~ddrcss dnd construe d~fferent arget groups and the~r concormtant tastes 
15 As ll~ckcn (1998 268) pornts out, d~fferent groups are dlfferently hlt by econormc crlses women more 
lliarl mcn, black drid H I S ~ ~ I ~ I C S  more than wh~tes, and blue-collar more than wh~te-collar workers 
I b. I>c R~vcra ( I998 18) cvcn speaks of an <aaparthe~d soc~o-económlco mund~ala 
17. In MGXICO, 101 ~nslancc, the marg~nalrzat~on of lndigenous communltles has severely lncreased durlng 
Ihc Lcn ycars thc Norih Arnerlcan F ~ e e  Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been establ~shed and so have, con- 
sctluc~il.ly, ~ni~lt~culti~ral confl~cts <<Estos confl~ctos se lntens~fican en tanto la poliuca económca neoll- 
bcr,~l, el accnluar en la irltrma década la pobteza y la marglnac~ón de 10s indígenas y mesbzos, agrava la 
m~g~:rcrGn y el dcsarrargo, 10s cnfreritam~entos por trerras y por el poder politlco~ (Garcia Cancllnl, 
1995 169) ITlieac conilrcls have ~ntenslfied ln the last decade slnce the neol~beral economc polit~cs 
:~cccn~tralcd povcrty, the nia~grnal~zat~on of ~nd~genous people and mestlzos, and aggravated rmgratlon 
and tryrootrng, thc contl~cts about land and polrtlcal power) 
18. As I,o Brdnco (2008 94) observes, some dlfferences become more accentuated through an increasing 
socto-cconolnlc ~ncclual~ly whereas others d~rmn~sh  aParadox~cally, in the sarne moment of cultural, 
crv~c onci pc~so~i,~l  d v c ~ s ~ t y  broi~ght about by global~sat~on, wlth its hybr~d language and cultural forms 
cnicrglng llom new populat~ori nuxes, there is also a massive contractlon of d w e r s ~ t y ~  
[Thsse regional cultures which lack economic, financial or political resources are 
faccd witli a devaluation of their human and ecological resources, their social capital 
and institutions, which equals a capitulation in the face of the political-economic 
foscc to cxpansion of the stronger [...]I 
E~811cr spcaks here of a double tendency to uniformation / homogenization and 
hicrarchization I structural heterogenization. The first refers to the reduction of 
diversity through the orientation and subjugation to a single value or standard, 
na~ncly suceess or cuse-value>> in the global market.I9 In turn, the term structural 
hclcrogenization $escribes the increased social stratification and disintegration 
oftcn cnmeshed with ethnicity and the marginalization of specific cultural 
grsups: 
Mil d icscm Bcgriff wird eine Gesellschafts - und Wirtschaftsstruktur gekennzeichnet, 
in dcr sieh unterschiedliche Produktionsniveaus und Produktionsweisen 
abgcsehichtet gelagert, miteinander verschranken - gewissermaRen im Spektrum 
von den hsch produktiven Tochterfirmen multinationaler Konzerne einerseits und 
cincr karglichet~ Selbstversorgungswirtschaft andererseits. Die bekannte Folge 
dicscr Struktur besteht in einer Akzentuierung der Kluft zwischen Reich und Arm, 
zwischcn Privilegierung und Marginalitat in ein und derselben Gesellschaft. 
(Scnghaas, 2002: 6-7) 
IThis term dcsignates a social and economic structure in which different levels and 
ways sf producing are hierarchically interrelated and layered - ranging for instance 
from highly productive subsidiaries of multinational companies on the one hand to 
a 117iscrable self-reliant economy on the other. The well-known consequence of this 
structure is the aecentuation of rich and poor, of privileges and marginalization in 
onc and thc same society.] 
4. The Concept of Tolerance 
Hardly a11y author writing in the area of intercultural cornmunication would 
disagrce with tllc view that ethical questions are fundamental to the field and lie 
at the heart s f  every theoretical and practica1 approach. Very little attention, 
though, is given to the complexities of those questions in relation to globalization. 
Inslcad, rnany authors refer vaguely to some ccethical imperatives,,, such as social 
IS). ctWbI11rnd U~vcrs~tal echte Versch~edenhe~t auf velen kulturellen Dlrnensionen meint, bedeutet hierarchische 
Un~l'orm~c~ ung dic ihr,qle~chhatmachung der Kulturen nach dem elnen MaJstab, dem des "Erfolges" auf 
dcm "Wcllmn~ kC"a (Elaner, 2000 8) [Wh~le diversity means authentic d~versity on a number of cultural 
ti~~ncns~ons, hlcrn~chlcal un~fornuty means the comparability of cultures dong one measure, <<success>> in 
lhc nglobal markct>>l. 
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justice, tliat require ccaddressing white privilege, racism, and other forms of 
prcjudices>> (Bennett, 2000: 20), showing their good-will without, however, 
addrcssing the intricacies these claims entail. 
Thc conccpt o€ tolerance is one of the most commonly used terms to 
describe thc etliics behind intercultural approaches, but it is far from being 
unproblcmatic. Tolcrance might actually imply asymmetrical power relations: 
l t  is thc knowlcdgc of the possession of power on one's side and of powerlessness 
on thc slhcr sidc, which makes communication difficult. In such a context, the 
possibilily oi an cecqual exchange*, or ccestablishing co-membership,,, of ccempathy 
and rapport)) - all o€ which are seen as essential to a good communication's 
cnvisonmncnt - are remote, for reasons which have little to do with language or 
accent, litlle to do with culture or with culturally derived speech conventions, but a 
greal dcal to do with structure. (Murray and Sondhi, 1987: 30, in Chang and Holt, 
1997: 208) 
The plea for tolerance thus <<implies conceding the validity of society's 
disapproval and relying on its self-restrainb (Parekh, 2000: 1). The structural 
advantagc of one group over another or of one individual over another might lie 
at the 1'001 of rnisunderstandings, misconstruals, divergent interests or values and 
rcsulting conflicts. In fact, unequal power relations are a necessary even if not 
sufficient precondition for the idea of tolerance to arise as a solution. Tolerance 
implics that Ihc tolerator has the power to interfere with, ec[. . .] infiuence, or remove 
thc offeiiding practice, but refrain from using that power>> (Mendus, 1989: 8). 
Thc appcal to tolerance is thus generally made towards majorities with the 
resources to exert influence on minorities in the hope that they will refrain from 
doing so. Thc problematic nature of crtolerance>> is particularly salient in the case 
of foreig~i and second language learners and speakers who have not yet fully 
c<mastcscd>> the language and discourses of the target speech community. They 
117ight be subjected to stereotyping processes (Giles and Coupland, 1991: 118) 
andJ i1ltin3ately, dismissed as incompetent communication partners on the basis 
of theis lower social status as immigrants.20 A quest for tolerance in this situation 
is ai1 ayycal to the goodwill of the native speaker diverting attention from the 
asy~iimctrical social structure of majority-minority relations that systematically 
distort the process of communication. 
Apart frorn the difficulties with this concept, the hope that is connected with 
the promotion of tolerance is in danger of failing in exactly those situations 
~vhich arc problcmatic, that is, in circumstances where diversity is <ccoupled with 
20. This plicnomcnsn has heen investigated under the heading of <<host-gatekeepern interaction. 
dislikc, disapproval or disgust>> (Mendus, 1989: 18-19) and, I would like to add, 
conflicts of interests. If not combined with a deeper understanding, the <<other>> 
is in Iliesc situations usually regarded as simply being wrong, with the result of 
tolcrance ending quickly and sharply. The suspension of good will can entail further 
cxclusionasy practices and transport us into a sphere of indifference (Wuthnow, 
Huntcr, Bcrgesen and Kurzweil, 1984: 239). The concept of tolerance can potentially 
mislead 11s into hasmonious thinking, fictitious neutrality and false ideas about 
real-world conflicts intertwined with issues of power and structure. It remains on 
tllc individual plane with no political message. 
Fsllowing from the above, I contend that a theory of intercultural cornrnunication 
is snly of intcrest and relevance if deeper seated conflicts are addressed that arise 
out OP different values, worldviews, interests and structural inequalities. If 
conflicts between members of different social and linguistic groups were simple 
lnisunderstandings about issues nobody has a stake in, these could easily be 
rcsolved. It is thercfore <dong overdue>> (Paige and Martin, 1996: 37; see also 
Blorn~~iaert and Verschueren, 1991: 10) to recognise that <<power and power 
diiirercntials inherent in the social and political context play a critica1 part in 
intercultural cducation>>. The analysis of ethnicity (and by implication culture, 
gcnder itnd otl~er markers of difference) should be set ccsquarely within the context 
of econslnic and political structure and process>> (Fenton, 1999: 236). As Parekh 
argues succinctly, misrecognition cannot be abolished by rationally persuading 
lhe dominant by intellectual argument and moral appeal: 
This is to lnisunderstand the dynamics of the process of recognition. Misrecognition 
has both a cultural and a material basis. White Americans, for example, take a 
dclncaning vicw sf  African Americans partly under the influence of the racist 
CLIICUI'G, partly because this legitimizes the prevailing system of dornination, and 
partly bcca~~sc the deeply disadvantaged blacks do sometimes exhibit some of the 
fcaturcs that confirln such stereotypes. Misrecognition, therefore, can only be 
countcrcd by both undertaking a rigorous critique of the dominant culture and 
radically rcstructuring the prevailing inequalities of economic and political power. 
Sincc the dominant group welcomes neither the radical critique nor the corresponding 
polilical praxis, thc struggle for recognition involves cultural and political contestation 
and so~nclilncs even violence, as Hegel (1960) highlighted in his analysis of the 
dialectic of recognition and which Taylor's (1994) sanitized version of it ignores. 
As LVC havc scen, the politics of culture is integrally tied up with the politics of 
powcr bccause culture is itself institutionalized power and deeply imbricate with 
othcr systcins sf power. Cultural self-esteem cannot be developed and sustained in 
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a vacuum cznd requires appropriate changes in all the major areas of life. No 
~n~~ltieultural society can be stable and vibrant unless it ensures that its constituent 
communitics rcceivc both just recognition and a just share of economic and political 
powcr. Xt requires a robust form of social, economic and political democracy to 
undcrpin its commitment to multiculturalism. (Parekh, 2000: 342-343) 
Any thcory of intercultural cornrnunication requires a discussion of the 
naturc of wcll-bcing and an explicit cornmitment to values such as social equality, 
fair distribution of resources, and social welfare. It should take into consideration 
thc divcrsc m d c s  of disaggregating people and generating inequality and relations 
of domination. Only by raising <<[. . ] the question of the social costs of economic 
violence; and lhus try[ing] to lay foundations for an economics of well-being>> 
(Bourelicu, 1998: 29) can processes of misrecognition and misunderstanding be 
~~ndc~*stood. 
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